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ABSTRACT 
 The Republic of China (ROC), also known as Taiwan, has been the haven of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) since its defeat at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
in 1949. Taiwan has long been the subject of control by foreign powers, which has 
created a unique history for the autonomous region. Historical circumstances have 
created a space for a distinct Taiwanese culture that has diverged from that of the 
mainland. This paper examines the role of this newfound culture on civic engagement, 
specifically regarding the sentiment for separatism or lessened ties with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). I examine the history of the island by first discussing the 
evolution of Taiwanese culture over the 20th and 21st centuries. I take a closer look 
following Taiwan’s democratization, which developed a deeper cultural cleavage that is 
politically salient. Cultural cleavages have only increased the nationalist sentiment of the 
Taiwanese people in pushing for greater separation – if not full-fledged independence – 
from the PRC. The results of my historical analysis argue the relevance of culture theory 
on the growing divide between Taiwan and China. In addition, this paper provides a 
perspective the effects of identity politics in Taiwan and its effect on cross-strait 
relations.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 The island of Taiwan has remained the subject of foreign governance for decades 
as native inhabitants have all too often been excluded from running their own institutions. 
Beginning with the Dutch trading posts in the 1600s to Japanese colonization in the late 
19th century, Taiwan’s historic foreign occupation deprived the native Taiwanese of full 
realization of cultural identity. On December 8, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taiwan after they were beaten by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The defeated Nationalist government relocated the Republic of 
China’s capital to Taipei, taking over the island as grounds to rebuild their shattered 
hopes with future dreams of a triumphant return to the mainland. 
 This mainland centric goal made the people of Taiwan, particularly the culture 
and identity of the Taiwanese people, a low priority for the KMT. The KMT suppressed 
Taiwanese culture in an effort to promote assimilation into “Chinese” culture. Taiwanese 
were barred from engaging in governmental and bureaucratic affairs. In an effort to 
maintain the prospect of regaining the mainland, the KMT policies and brutal actions of 
suppression alientated the Taiwanese and artificially created a deep cultural divide 
between the waisheng (mainlanders) and the bensheng (Taiwanese). Making the 
expression of Taiwanese political culture illegal under martial law suppressed the 
political salience of cultural cleavages between the waisheng (mainlanders) and the 
bensheng (Taiwanese).  
 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) regards the Republic of China (ROC), 
more commonly referred to as Taiwan, as a lost province. The primary goal of the PRC is 
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to see an eventual reunification of Taiwan and the mainland. However, the foundational 
idea of the “Republic of China” is a far away concept that the people of Taiwan have 
trouble identifying with. Taiwanese culture and national identity are factors that cannot 
be easily won over by the PRC neither by gentle persuasion nor by display of force. The 
inability to convince the people of Taiwan, especially the millennial generation, to 
identify as Chinese will disrupt cross strait relations including, the possibility of peaceful 
reunification. Differences in governmental structure, language, culture, and economic 
growth have only deepened the divide between the PRC and Taiwan.   
  In this paper, I argue that the unique ethnocultural background of the people of 
Taiwan creates an environment for the cultural cleavage between the mainland and 
Taiwan to become politically salient. Specifically, I am examining the environments that 
lead the Taiwanese to favor separatism and full-fledged independence. What 
circumstances have afforded the Taiwanese the ability to fully express their political 
culture? How has a distinct Taiwanese identity translated into any particular cross-strait 
policy?  
 First, this paper examines the definition of culture, political culture and culture 
theory in comparative political analysis. I discuss the various forms of nationalism that 
coincide with culture theory. Second, my method of historical analysis is utilized to bring 
clarity to the specific aims of cultural theory. I then conduct my historical analysis on the 
sentiments of Taiwanese culture over the 20th century and up to the present time. I expect 
to find that while Taiwanese culture had a large role in the resistance against foreign rule, 
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Taiwanese political culture and mobilization was fully realized after the full 
democratization of Taiwan in 1996.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defining Culture 
  “Cultures differ, among other ways, in how people view authority relations, in 
their members’ commitment to particular religious or ideological views, and in the 
content and salience of their historical memories.”1  
Defining Culture in the Context of Political Analysis   
 Political culture as a concept came to fruition starting in the 20th Century when 
Gabriel Almond coined the term “political culture”. According to Almond, “Every 
political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action”. 2 
“Political culture became a significant subfield of political science, and in 1963 Almond 
and Verba published The Civic Culture—a cross national study offering a theory of 
political stability and democracy that implicitly celebrated Anglo-American 
representative government—which became a major work of the political culture 
approach.”.3 Almond and Verba attempted to separate culture into separate cognitive, 
affective and evaluative domains. Civic Culture created high regards for the American 
government and its leaders. Thus, when confidence in American leadership was high, 
faith in the political culture theory was consequentially just as prominent. The 																																																								
1 Tianjian Shi, The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 20.  
2 Gabriel A. Almond "Comparative Political Systems." The Journal of Politics 18, no. 3 (1956): 
391-409. 
3Ronald P. Formisano, “The Concept of Political Culture”, The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, Vol. 31, No.3 (Winter. 2001), pp. 396-397., 
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resemblance of political culture success explains how the Anglo-American political 
system and ethnocentrism led to the simultaneous rejection of the theory of 
modernization.4  
Political scientists do tend to reject the value of political culture as an explanation 
for one’s political decisions. Jackson and Miller reject political culture, stating that 
“institutional variations provide a parsimonious and powerful explanation of political 
participation rates across the industrial democracies.”5 Further, Elkins and Simeon 
emphasized that political culture could not be an explanation for events on its own. It 
would have to be “almost always in conjunction with other variables.” According to 
Elkins and Simeon, cultural, institutional, and structural explanations were “not 
competitors, but collaborators… Instead of asking whether institutions cause culture or 
culture causes institutions, we should look for their joint effects.”6 Elkins and Simeon’s 
recommendation is, however, rejected by the majority of political scientists.  
 Culturally defined meanings play a critical role in explaining human behavior. 
Meaning systems orient people to situations, similar to the way that maps orient 
travelers.7 Each actor in a political scenario may choose how he or she wishes to interpret 
the meaning of an event. According to Tianjian Shi:  
After decoding the meaning of an event, actors need to decide whether to respond 
and, if so, in what way. An actor responding to a political event with which he or 
she disagrees may choose protest, write to newspaper editors; donate money to a 																																																								
4 Ibid.,  
5Ronald P. Formisano, “The Concept of Political Culture”, The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, Vol. 31, No.3 (Winter. 2001), pp. 396-397., 
6 Ibid., 
7 Tianjian Shi, The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, 
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cause supporting his or her view…join secret societies or, in an extreme case, 
become a terrorist. Each actor’s evaluative and affective orientations help him/her 
decide on the proper goals and the proper means for pursuing such goals. 8 
 
This is not to say that the actor is motivated by “rational choice” as most rational choice 
theorists would explain this phenomenon. Shi implies that actors of different cultural 
backgrounds will vary systematically in the meanings that they derive from the same 
information. 9  
 For Weber, the primary objective of cultural study was to explore the normative 
rationality of social action. In order to achieve this, “researchers must focus on 
orientations that assign “meaning” and “purpose” to the political actions of individuals 
and to the political processes of societies. The most important of these orientations are 
norms.”10 Weber’s action theory of political culture is the portion of political culture that 
this paper will be focusing on. Not only will political culture be explaining attitudes but 
also its result on social action such as, joining a political party, attending a public protest, 
and even running for office. Political culture serves as a helpful starting point from which 
we begin the discussion in examining the rise of social action toward independence in 
Taiwan.  
Culture Theory in Comparative Analysis 
Culture Theory in Comparative Politics 
Culture theory can aid in the process of understanding why particular actions are 
taken and others are not.  Cultural theory typically states that cultural norms are formed 
																																																								
8 Ibid.,  
9 Ibid.,  
10 Ibid.,  
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in one’s youth and are carried with them throughout their lives. People’s cultural values 
usually reflect the social, economic, and institutional environments in their society at the 
time they came of age.11 The environment may vary from one generation to the next, and 
thus generational replacement has the ability to alter the culture in a society over time. 
Culture is at least partially independent from structure and institutions, so that social and 
institutional change does not quickly bring about corresponding changes in culture.12   
Ross describes the many contributions of culture to the study of comparative politics as: 
Culture frames the context in which politics occurs. Culture orders political 
priorities meaning that it defines the symbolic and material objects people 
consider valuable and worth fighting over, the contexts in which such disputes 
occur, the rules (both formal and informal) by which politics takes place, and who 
participates in it….Culture links individual and collective identities. Culture 
defines group boundaries and organizes actions within and between them. Culture 
provides a framework for interpreting the actions and motives of others. Few 
behaviors are so universal that they require little or no interpretation and 
invocation of culturally available narratives and scripts to help people make sense 
of ambiguous but emotionally salient situations.13  
 
In addition, culture provides the basis for gathering resources for political organization 
and mobilization. The focus of this paper is the way in which Taiwanese political culture 
and national identity motivates the Taiwanese to mobilize for a government that puts 
Taiwan first and Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC last. While it is imperative to 
recognize that culture is an extremely broad concept that can encompass much more than 
political mobilization, political culture serves as an encompassing theory for national 
identity.  
																																																								
11 Mark Irving Lichbach, and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds. Comparative Politics Rationality, Culture 
and Structure, New York: Cambridge University Press 1997 
12 Ibid.,  
13 Ibid.,  
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Culture is not a static, unchanging phenomenon marked by fixed beliefs and 
unalterable practices.14 “Instead, the emphasis is on the interactive, constructed nature of 
culture, which suggests a capacity to modify beliefs and behaviors, including shifts and 
rearrangements in the salience of specific cultural understandings”.15  It is imperative to 
inquire how organizations of any particular culture produce the specific effects attributed 
to it as well as why appeals to cultural identity are so powerful that people are willing to 
take high risks in its name.16 Change-oriented groups often emerge when there are shifts 
in culture as the change meets their core needs. This is exemplified with the creation of 
the DPP when democratization was rumored to be on its way in Taiwan. Political leaders 
take the opportunity to relay messages that would cater to the shift in culture. 
Further, the examination of the transitional period between different systems of 
government is crucial to the study of culture theory and nationalistic identity. According 
to Horowitz and Tan, “One would expect changes from one authoritarian regime to 
another, or changes between democratic and authoritarian regimes, to have the potential 
to produce more drastic changes in national identities and interest…Changes under 
democracy are potentially larger when there has been a recent transition from 
authoritarianism, and when post-transition governments have remained relatively 
conservative.”.17  Democratization of a government can lead to relative changes in the 
identity of the population. The opportunity for free speech provides those who have not 
																																																								
14 Ibid.,  
15 Ibid.,  
16 Ibid.,  
17 S., U. Heo Horowitz, and A. Tan, Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of 
China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), p. 6, 
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had the right to freedom of speech the chance to reclaim their political identity in a public 
space.  
Concept of Nationalism and National Identity 
  National identity can serve as a useful tool to understand Taiwanese political 
culture on the spectrum ranging from pro-unification to pro-independence. In order to 
study the developing Taiwanese national identity, it is imperative to understand the 
concept of nationalism. Nationalism combines a theory of society and politics with a 
prescription of action and change. 18 According to Anthony Smith, “it weds a cultural 
account of politics to an activist ethic” with the supreme goal for a “national identity”. 19  
A national identity is created from the growth of deep bonds of emotional solidarity with 
citizens right to participation and decision-making. 20 A distinct national identity serves 
to guard sovereign independence as the population immerses itself into the identity of 
their shared history.  
 Nationalism as a political principle maintains that similarity in culture is the 
fundamental social bond.21  As stated in Ernest Gellner’s piece Nationalism, the core idea 
of nationalism is the legitimacy of a group of people that are associated with the same 
culture.22  Nationalism is not derived by accident—it is a consequence of specific social 
conditions that serve to consolidate a change-oriented group’s political goals for the 
purpose of political mobilization.  																																																								
18 Anthony D Smith. Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. (New York: New York University 
Press, 1979), p. 87, 
19 Ibid., p. 87,  
20 Ibid., p. 87 
21 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism. (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 3 
22 Ibid., p. 4,  
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The Harmony of Ethnocultural and Civic Nationalism  
A cultural examination of national identity must therefore stem from the topic of 
civic and ethnocultural nationalism. Schubert points out that “national identity can shift 
from ethnic to civic and vice versa, while the volatility of this shift depends upon how 
deeply the idea of the nation is entrenched in the social psychology of the community.” 23 
Thus, examining the interconnected concepts of ethnocultural and civic nationalism could 
help to garner a better understanding of the shift towards a distinct Taiwanese identity. 
According to David Brown, the concept of civic nationalism is best described as: 
…a sense of community which is focused on the belief that residence in a 
common territorial homeland, and commitment to its state and civil society 
institutions, generate a distinctive national character and civic culture, such that 
all citizens, irrespective of their diverse ancestry, comprise a community in 
progress, with a common destiny. This commitment to a common destiny, tied 
into the idea of common loyalty to the territory and its institutions means that 
civic nationalism implies the acquisition of ethical obligations, and should not be 
regarded simply as a voluntary association lacking emotive power… sometimes 
depicted as ‘forward-looking’ in the sense that the vision is of a community in the 
process of formation, while ethnocultural nationalism is seen as backward-
looking, in that the vision of the community is located in myths of the past.  24 
 
Schubert argues that the Taiwanese society has been a society of civic nationalism since 
democratization in the 1990s. The idea of the “New Taiwanese” creates a political 
contract between all ethnic groups on the island including, Mainlanders, Hoklo, Hakkas, 
and Aborigines.25 This concept “aims at constitution of a new nation based on common 
																																																								
23 Steven Goldstein and Julian Chang. Presidential Politics in Taiwan: The Administration of 
Chen Shui-Bian, (Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2008), p. 88., 
24 David Brown. Contemporary Nationalism : Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics. 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2000),  
25 Steven Goldstein and Julian Chang. Presidential Politics in Taiwan: The Administration of 
Chen Shui-Bian, (Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2008), p. 89., 
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history as well as the democratic achievements of all Taiwan people, irrespective of their 
former frictions and antagonisms.”26   
Subsequently, ethnocultural nationalism offers a vision of a community united by 
a belief in common ancestry.27 The “New Taiwanese” identity creates a community in 
that can be easily mobilized on the basis of shared experiences.  It is the interconnected 
concepts of civic nationalism and ethnocultural nationalism that can explain the further 
departure from any identity that may coincide with the mainland.  
Culture Theory of Politics in Taiwan 
In the context of this paper, Taiwanese consciousness must be defined in relation 
to cultural identity, political culture, and national identity.  Taiwanese consciousness has 
been through centuries of repression and resistance against the foreign government that 
has held power. As a result, Taiwanese consciousness has remained a subset of resistance 
that does not align with that of a foreign ruling party.  
According to Liao Ping-Hui, “Taiwan has gone through several colonial stages—
Dutch conquest (1622-1661), Chinese settlement (1661-1895), Japanese occupation 
(1895-1945), and Nationalist “recovery” (after 1945). Various ethnic groups came to the 
island at different times and brought with them diverse racial and cultural heritages. 
Taiwan’s different communities and their historical experiences have been made more 
complex by this hybrid ethnic and genealogical mixture.”28 The unique cultural 																																																								
26 Ibid. p. 89.,  
27 David Brown. Contemporary Nationalism : Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics. 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 126,  
28 Binghui Lia, Dewei Wang, and JSTOR Provider. Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895-
1945 History, Culture, Memory. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) p.4., 
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experience of Taiwan has created an environment in which a combination of any, if not 
all, previous cultural experiences can be formed into a distinct Taiwanese identity, 
subsequently, fostering a Taiwanese identity that could serve as a focal point of resisting 
foreign rule.  
Taiwanese cultural identity is a phenomenon described by Tu Weiming, as “on 
the surface, the issue of cultural identity seems to be the inevitable consequence of the 
disintegration of the dominant neo-traditional, conservative and conformist ideology.”29 
However, in Taiwan’s case, “the matter is complicated by three factors: the inability of 
the newly emerging political centre to define Taiwan’s national identity, the 
transformation of Taiwan’s nativism from a counterhegemonic critique of Sino-centrism 
to a dominant ideology, and the development of a public sphere where numerous social 
forces contend for power and influence.”30 Taiwanese cultural identity is no longer within 
the control of the political center but has moved toward an extreme sentiment of 
nativism.  
The term “Taiwanese” (Taiwanren) was initially coined during Japanese 
colonization as an attempt to express Chinese national sentiments against the Japanese. 31 
In Ito Kiyoshi’s book Taiwan: Four Hundred Years of History and Its Outlook, Kiyoshi 
summarizes four hundred years of Taiwanese history, starting from the Dutch rule during 
the age of mercantilism to present day. Kiyoshi locates the birth of “Taiwanese 
consciousness” in the early days of Japanese rule, and its further maturation in the 																																																								
29 Tu Wei-ming. “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan”, The 
China Quarterly, no. 148 (1996):1115-140., 
30 Ibid.,  
31 Ibid.,  
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struggle for Taiwanese independence that came out of the February 28 Incident, a brutal 
military crackdown against Taiwanese protest by the KMT in 1947.32   
 Jean-Pierre Cabestan best describes the February 28 Incident as producing “a two-
fold phenomenon which was to prove lasting: on the one hand, a feeling of nostalgia for 
the Japanese period… and on the other hand, the affirmation of a Taiwanese 
consciousness and a Taiwanese identity based on a specific historical path, as well as a 
demand for autonomy and democracy on the part of the Taiwanese elites which has 
gradually given birth to a genuine independence movement”. 33 The events that occurred 
between the 228 Incident, as the February 28 Incident is popularly called, and the White 
Terror following full KMT takeover of Taiwan “contributes to this tragic history, 
which—by being remembered—creates national cohesiveness and identity. It is the 
shared historical memory of people that arouses the feeling to be part of a national 
community.” 34  
 Until the 1970s, KMT political goals were focused on returning to the mainland 
triumphant over the CCP. Thus, the KMT considered Taiwan as a province and 
disenfranchised the people of Taiwan from any political process. Following the full 
democratization of Taiwan, Taiwanese cultural identity has grown exponentially under 
the environment of free speech. Tu Weiming explains, “as already being implied, the 
																																																								
32 As noted in, Binghui Liao, Dewei Wang, and JSTOR Provider. Taiwan Under Japanese 
Colonial Rule, 1895-1945 History, Culture, Memory. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), p.62.,  
33 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, and Michael Black. "Specificities and Limits of Taiwanese 
Nationalism." China Perspectives, no. 62 (2005): 32-43,  
34 Gunter Schubert. "A New Rising Nation? The Discourse on National Identity in Contemporary 
Taiwan." China Perspectives, no. 23 (1999): 54-64. 
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popularity of Taiwanization, not only for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) but 
also for the new leadership of the KMT, compels both the ruling minority and the cultural 
elite to abandon the seemingly outmoded China-centered cultural policy of past decades.” 
35 In this transitional period, the “politics of recognition” will inevitably challenge all 
forms of institutional structure and cultural practice tainted with perceived Chinese 
chauvinism.36 Taiwanese consciousness inevitably clashes with Chinese identity. The 
emergence of Taiwanese culture serves as a nationalistic tool that aide in the rise of 
policy that puts Taiwan at the forefront.  
According to Gunter Schubert, there are “three conceptual stages of theoretical 
nation-building within this discourse can be identified:  
Taiwanese ethno (-cultural) nationalism, which is set against Chinese ethno-
nationalism, describing Taiwan as a historically and culturally distinct 
community… sometimes even suggesting the existence of a specific Taiwanese 
ethnicity or race; multi-ethnic nationalism, promoting the idea of  ‘four great 
ethnic groups’ (sige da zuqun) with equal rights and status, by that overcoming 
the old ‘provincial’ conflict and making ethnic harmony the basis of the new 
Taiwanese nation; political or state nationalism, which tries to transcend ethnicity 
and argues for a Taiwanese nation based on constitutionalism and the liberal state. 
37  
 
Furthermore, Horowitz and Tan describe the continued evolution of Taiwanese 
identity in terms of shift from authoritarian regimes to those that are democratic. 
Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea and liberalization in China have forced 
																																																								
35 Tu Wei-ming. “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan”, The 
China Quarterly, no. 148 (1996): p. 1123, 
36 Ibid. p. 1123,  
37 Schubert, Gunter, “A New Rising Nation? The Discourse of National Identity in Contemporary 
Taiwan”, China Perspectives, No. 23, China Special: The Emergence of Industrial Groups (May - 
June 1999): p. 55,  
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leaders to compete for popular legitimacy by appealing to national identities. 38 National 
identities are central to explaining the origins and ongoing character of the cross-strait 
relations between the PRC and the ROC. Particularly in democracies and less repressive 
authoritarian regimes, changing national identities interact with changing external 
conditions to influence political competition and leadership outcomes, and thereby, 
national security goals and strategies.39  
According to Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “a nationalist current has long existed in 
Taiwan that one could call fundamentalist, which favours pure and simple independence 
and is convinced that Taiwanese culture does not belong to Chinese culture.”40 The ROC 
was favored the emergence of a Taiwanese national consciousness that the 
democratization of Taiwan in 1986 has consolidated.41 Cabestan argues that the rise of 
Taiwanese national consciousness is the confirmation of the thesis of Gellner or of 
Hobsbawm, that the state of the Republic of China, by default Taiwan after 1949, is the 
main ferment of Taiwanese nationalism.42 
 Stockton discusses national culture and identity with regards to the 
“Hutchinson’s dichotomy of nationalism” which distinguishes between political and 
cultural nationalism. Stockton describes this dichotomy as “an effort to secure a 
sovereign representative state for the community and to secure its members’ rights to 
																																																								
38 S., U. Heo Horowitz, and A. Tan, Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of 
China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), pp. 4-5,  
39 Ibid., pp. 4-5,  
40 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, and Michael Black. "Specificities and Limits of Taiwanese 
Nationalism." China Perspectives, no. 62 (2005): p. 32, 
41 Ibid., p.32,  
42 Ibid., p. 32,  
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citizenship…” 43 Nationalism can be a powerful tool to reunite various aspects of the 
nation that utilizes the premise on a sense of community derived from shared history, 
beliefs, customs, and habit. Thus, Stockton notes, “cultural nationalism, as long as it was 
Chinese cultural nationalism under the KMT, facilitated reunification. 44  More recently, 
in the face of a rising Taiwanese cultural and political nationalism, prospects for 
reunification have dimmed.”  
Taiwan’s isolationism from the mainland has provided the island with sufficient 
time and space for the emergence of a new Taiwanese identity. Stockton argues that 
Taiwan finds itself in an identity crisis, where political development and new historical 
conditions have created a situation in which, the traditional sense of identity, linked to the 
mainland, is being found untenable. 45 Political cultural identity has at large shifted 
towards the notion of being politically Taiwanese.  
Tu Weiming contends that “Taiwan’s ready abandonment of its role as a model 
province for the PRC and its self-assigned mission to be the preserver and transmitter of 
Chinese culture is the result of a new political ecology that was shaped by the Taiwanized 
KMT to redefine its cultural identity.”46 Taiwanese political culture—the ability to 
publicly state a political ideology against the dominant ideology such as, independence 
leaning, remaining at status quo, and decreased ties with the mainland— was not fully 
realized until the advent of full democratization. 																																																								
43 S., U. Heo Horowitz, and A. Tan, Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of 
China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), p. 52, 
44 Ibid., p. 52.,  
45 Ibid., p. 53, 
46 Tu Wei-ming. “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan”, The 
China Quarterly, no. 148 (1996):1115-140., 
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 Thus, “since the ‘sorrow of being Taiwanese’ (Taiwanren de beiai) has, in a 
significant way, been caused by the hegemonic discourse of the pre-Taiwanized KMT, 
the rejection of chauvinist Chinese culturalisms is perceived as a precondition for the 
purification of the Taiwanese soul.”47 Taiwanese consciousness stems from eradicating 
civic nationalism for the Republic of China in favor of a Taiwanese national identity.   
METHODOLOGY 
Culture theory, in this context, can be best demonstrated through the use of 
historical analysis.  Comparative historical analysis has a long history in social science, 
largely introduced by the likes of Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Karl Marx. 
Historical analysis maintains its central position of today’s social sciences. Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer reserve the term “comparative historical analysis” for a distinct type of 
research defined by relatively specific characteristics:  
Comparitive historical inquiry is fundamentally concerned with explanation and 
the identification of causal configurations that produce with explanation and the 
identification of causal configurations that produce major outcomes of interest. In 
comparative historical studies, the causal argument is central to the analysis; thus, 
causal propositions are carefully selected and tested rather than introduced ad hoc 
as incidental parts of an overall narrative. As such, comparative historical analysis 
does not include work that explicitly rejects causal analysis or that eschews it in 
favor of other research goals. 48 
 
Thus, it is appropriate to utilize historical analysis to understand the events that has 
caused a Taiwanese consciousness to emerge.   
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 The historical analysis in this paper consists of four major periods – pre-Japanese 
colonization, Japanese colonization, KMT hegemonic rule, and post democracy in 
Taiwan. I emphasize events following the end of Japanese colonization in 1945 to 
highlight the events that resulted in cultural cleavages between the people of Taiwan and 
mainland China. 
My analysis covers over a century of Taiwanese history in an attempt to create a 
comprehensive timeline of the social, institutional, and economic environments that 
created Taiwanese ethnnocultural identity and civic nationalism. A distinct Taiwanese 
cultural identity, political culture and national identity have grown in importance among 
the Taiwanese community as the result of a sentiment of solidarity for a shared 
Taiwanese history.  Culture theory can best describe the shift towards this newfound 
Taiwanese consciousness by describing the social, economic, and institutional 
environment each generation has experienced.  
The historical examination of each of the selected periods of time will distinguish 
what it meant to be Taiwanese at each given moment in history up to the present time. It 
is imperative to note that in order to explain or even predict Taiwan’s attitudes towards 
the mainland, we must uncover the Taiwanese political culture and ethnocultural identity. 
In particular, we must look into the cultural positions of the major players involved in the 
making of the mainland policy.   
Furthermore, it is important to note that Taiwanese cultural identity did not 
always translate into a shared sense of Taiwanese civic nationalism or political culture. It 
was the rise of a full democracy that created an environment in which the Taiwanese 
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could not only their political culture in an open, engaging, and effective manner, but also, 
take social action—including, joining a opposition political party, attending a public 
protest, and even running for public office.  
Democracy and the awakening of Taiwanese consciousness can be studied as 
intertwined concepts that may be utilized to explain the shift in Taiwanese policy on 
unification.  It is my expectation that the historical analysis will display an emergence of 
Taiwanese consciousness following democracy. Taiwanese consciousness creates a clear 
cultural cleavage between Taiwan and the mainland that is politically salient as it affords 
the Taiwanese people the freedom to take social action. Thus, Taiwanese consciousness 
can explain the fervor towards nation building and civic engagement of a Taiwanese 
government rather than a unified country with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Pre-Japanese Colonization 
 Taiwan’s position in the Western Pacific Rim has landed itself to be a maritime 
crossroads. The island was a stopping point for the Spanish and the Dutch in the 1600s. 
In 1626, the Spanish set up forts and missions at Keelung and Tamsui on the island’s 
northern tip. 49 The Dutch utilized the area that is known as the city of Tainan in present-
day to set up trading posts. The objective of the Dutch was to disrupt Portuguese trade at 
Macao and interfere with the Spanish shipping near the Philippines. In 1642, the Dutch 
Protestants drove the Spanish Catholics out of the north and held Taiwan for the next two 
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decades with relatively low conflict. 50 The Dutch faced a decent amount of resistance in 
Tam-sui and sent reinforcements to bring the area under control in 1644. 51 
 The Dutch built a seminary in 1657 to set up to educate thirty indigenous 
seminarians in the Dutch language. By this time, 6,078 of the 10,109 members of the 
aboriginal population understood Christian teachings and 2,784 understood more than 
simple prayers.52  Dutch missionary education and its rule came to an end in 1661 when 
Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) attacked with 25,000 soldiers. This European period of 
control on Taiwan was short lived as the Chinese reclaimed the island. In addition, the 
short nature of Dutch colonization made for a much smaller impact on the formation of 
Taiwanese identity.    
  Zheng Cheng-gong’s family ruled Taiwan from 1661-1683.53 Zheng’s life was 
riddled with tumultuous family politics and later slipped into insanity and died on June 
23, 1662.54 The Qing imperial empire sent admiral Shi Lang, who had previously broken 
away from Zheng’s camp, to conquer the island and in 1683.55 Shi Lang quickly 
consolidated control over Taiwan.56 From 1661-1895, the Qing imperial China ruled 
Taiwan as the first Chinese ruler on the island. During this period of time, the Han ethnic 
population increased by 1.8 million reaching 2 million. 57   																																																								
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Japanese Colonization 
 Japan has no previous planning to take over the island of Taiwan. During peace 
negotiations, Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi stipulated that both Taiwan and the Pescadores 
islands were to be ceded by imperial China.58 On May 8, 1895, the Qing imperial court 
ceded Taiwan and the nearby Pescadores islands to Tokyo in the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
after China was defeated in war with Japan.59 Japanese colonization was met by 
immediate resistance from the Taiwanese people. Governor Tang Ching-sung attempted 
to create an anti-Japanese resistance under an island regime, labeled the “Taiwan 
Republic”. 60 Governor Tang’s followers feared that Japanese colonization would 
jeopardize the preservation of Chinese culture and civilization. However, these attempts 
at preemptive resistance were futile as Governor Tang Ching-sung and his aides escaped 
to the mainland shortly before the Japanese troops arrived in Taipei.61  
 Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Meiji Japan allowed the registered inhabitants a 
choice to return to China by May 8, 1897 and remain Qing subjects or to stay in Taiwan, 
or return to Taiwan before the deadline, and become Japanese citizens. 62 The wealthy 
elites were among the largest groups to leave Taiwan during this period of time as those 
who would remain would be heavily disenfranchised under the Japanese colonial 
government. Despite many instances of armed resistance against the Japanese, the 
inhabitants of Taiwan were growing less attached to the mainland as a result of the 1895 																																																								
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cession. Thus, by the time the 1897 deadline was reached, the Taiwanese were no longer 
subjects of Chinese nationality, beginning a new era of a struggling Japanese identity.  
 Japanese colonial reform was a harsh burden on the inhabitants of Taiwan. The 
most important law that provided power to the governor-general was Law 63, the right to 
enact “decrees as law” (ritsurei). This law empowered governor-generals to “suspend or 
cancel any order or any administrative measure of local government that they deemed 
‘inconsistent with the rules or regulations, or to be prejudicial to the public interest, or to 
trespass beyond the proper jurisdiction of such authority.’”63 Under Law 63, governor-
generals were also authorized “to appoint and dismiss at their discretion of the lowest-
ranking rank of local officials, and if they were able to secure Imperial assent, they could 
impose disciplinary measures upon upper-ranking officials and dismiss middle-ranking 
officials.” 64   
 Much armed resistance to the Japanese thrived during the first two decades of 
Japanese colonization. “Banditry”, defined as guerilla organized crime against the 
Japanese, ensued as a disruption of the established Japanese colony. In response to 
banditry, the Japanese government enacted the Bandit Punishment Ordinance in which 
according to Fong Shiaw-Chian, the punishments were as follows: 
Those bandits who gather themselves to coerce or threaten others, no matter what 
their purposes are, are subject to punishment according to the ollowing criteria:  
1. The leaders and the instigators are sentenced to death. 
2. Those who participate in the decision-making or commanding are sentenced to 
death.  
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3. The mere participants or those who provide services are subject to 
imprisonment for a definite term and to harsh corvée.  	
Banditry and organized resistance against the Japanese was not to be tolerated by the 
Japanese government. For example, Houbling, a Taiwanese stronghold in the Kaohsiung 
area, was a group led by guerilla Lin Shao Mao beat back attempts by Japanese soldiers 
to disband them. 65 Lin was able to obtain a deal with the Japanese who had suffered 
large casualties in fighting the Houbling.  However, in 1902, a larger force of Japanese 
troops attacked and massacred about two hundred Taiwanese and wiped Houbling from 
the map.  
 The Japanese government was brutally adamant about assimilation to the 
Japanese culture. Assimilation was a key component of each governor-general’s platform 
of governance in Taiwan. The Taiwanese were expected to give up their customs and 
language but also their Chinese heritage as a whole. In some cases, the Taiwanese were 
more willing to become more Japanized as the systematic exploitation and discrimination 
of the newly “Japanese” would be harder to justify.66   
 Policies enacted towards assimilation were different between administrations 
throughout the years of Japanese rule. General Akashi Motojiro (June 1918-October 
1919) and Den Kenjiro (October 1919-September 23) serve as examples of different 
applications of assimilation policies. While both Governor-generals believed in the need 
for assimilation, they differed vastly in regards to their assimilationist outlooks and 
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agendas.67 Akashi favored a limited form of assimilation in which only a set number of 
Taiwanese would be Japanized. Strict segregation in the colony was heavily enforced by 
Akashi. On the other hand, Den favored the Japanization of Taiwan to overcome 
discriminatory colonial practices, which he felt obstructed the assimilation process.68 Den 
believed that education played an important role in the assimilation process and declared 
acculturation (kyoka) must be extended beyond the instruction offered through formal 
schooling.69 
 Taiwanese sekimin, or Taiwanese registered people, were given extraterritorial 
privileges under the Japanese consular jurisdiction. Overseas Taiwanese settlements 
became business communities in which the sekimin were able to operate with relatively 
low levels of surveillance by the Japanese. However, the sekimin identity became 
ambiguous and detrimental to community residents in the provinces of Fujian and 
Guangdong.70 Following the 1895-1897 period in which Taiwanese residents could 
choose a either Chinese or Japanese residency, many Taiwanese who fled to the two 
coastal provinces became prominent entrepreneurs in the local treaty ports. 71 While these 
entrepreneurs associated themselves with the Japanese consuls, they never attained 
official Japanese registry. 72 Some Chinese residents in these business communities were 
thus able to obtain sekimin status in order to maintain extraterritorial privileges.  
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 Taiwanese sekimin status would, however, be degraded as many Taiwanese ronin 
opened opium dens, brothels, and gambling stores, and even committed crimes 
sometimes with the support of the Japanese government. 73 Chinese nationals grew to 
resent the Taiwanese sekimin and cast the Taiwanese as a whole as outsiders to the 
coastal provinces. Further, anti-Japanese sentiment only added to the Chinese resentment 
of the Taiwanese sekimin. Taiwanese shops and establishments were frequent targets of 
abuse, especially during anti-Japanese boycotts and demonstrations. 74   
 Taiwanese culture was also used as a guise for practicing a political stance against 
the Japanese hegemony. In 1920, leaders of the Taiwanese intelligentsia began to 
establish associations and publish periodicals. 75 Taiwanese-inspired political movements 
developed more fully with the founding of the New People’s Society. According to Harry 
Hamley, “the possibility of full assimilation and fusion with metropolitan Japan became 
unacceptable to most of the new intelligentsia after the unpopular Law 63 was again 
extended by the Imperial Diet, but this time for an indefinite period. In protest, the 
leaders of the New People’s Society rejected the options of integration with Japan or 
restoration to China then being debated and, instead opted to advance home rule by 
establishing a parliament in Taiwan.” 76 Japanese colonization had only pushed the 
Taiwanese people away from Chinese solidarity and instead, the desire for autonomy.  
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 In 1921, the Taiwanese Cultural Association, organized primarily by Chiang Wei-
shui, operated under the guise of advancing Taiwanese culture and disavowed any 
political aspirations.77 However, the association supported many political movements that 
called for home rule and the establishment of a Taiwan parliament. The Taiwanese 
Cultural Association is often regarded as the “one organization most responsible for the 
development of Formosan nationalism”.78  The Governor-general would shut down any 
advancement towards self-governance or universal suffrage for the Taiwanese. 
 In 1936, much of the oppressive sentiment against the Taiwanese began to change 
as the Second Sino-Japanese war began in North China. Under the rule of Admiral 
Kobayashi Seizo, Taiwan’s seventeenth Governor-general, Taiwan became a strategic 
springboard for Japan’s “southward advance” into southern China and Southeast Asia. 79 
Taiwan served as a staging area for the capture of Canton and later the occupation of 
Hainan island in February 1939. 80 
 During the wartime period, the policy of kominka, meaning Imperial-
subjectization, provided a number of government-sponsored assimilationist programs and 
reforms. As a part of the policy, the government legalized Taiwanese-Japanese 
intermarriage, opened the Imperial University in Taipei to Taiwanese students, and 
banned Chinese-language radio broadcasts. 81 The Japanese eradicated the use of the 
Chinese language in newspaper publications and educational systems in favor of 
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Japanese language versions. Further, the Japanese attempted to replace the predominant 
Chinese cultural and religious practices. 82 Kominka was also utilized to stir fervor for 
military recruitment campaigns, as military service was not made compulsory in Taiwan. 
Military recruitment depended on persuasion and incentives by portraying military 
service as a further step towards Japanization. 83 
 Religious assimilation was an integral part of the Japanization as Shintoism, the 
Japanese state religion, was forced upon the Taiwanese. Governor-general Kobayashi 
then ordered the construction of more Shinto shrines in the colony and the destruction of 
traditional Chinese religious sites that many Taiwanese communities practiced in. 84 
Kominka seeped into the everyday lives of the Taiwanese as even Chinese attire was 
policed by the Japanese authorities. Few Taiwanese were transformed into “true 
Japanese” by way of the imperialization process, and local resentment was stirred by 
harsh and demanding kominka measures. 85  
 Taiwanese sekimin experienced instances of discrimination during the war as they 
were forced to remain loyal to Japan. Sekimin communities in Fujian suffered many 
casualties and property damage over the first two years of the war, when a Guangdong 
army division, and the principal governor and local Chinese authorities moved to clear 
out the Taiwanese from the seaport areas of the province. 86 Taiwanese were 
disenfranchised both on the mainland as well as in their island home. Both the Japanese 
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and the mainland Chinese maintained a strict distinction between the Taiwanese sekimin 
and their respective communities.  
 During the Sino-Japanese war, Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, turned his 
attention to retaining the lost territories that had previously been ceded to the Japanese. 
Chiang Kai-shek met with United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Cairo, Egypt on November 1943. The United States 
recognizing that China was a valuable ally in the effort against Japan released an official 
statement demanding that  “all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such 
as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China’.87  
 The Cairo Declaration, as it later became known, was a document that served as 
the basis of the eventual turnover of Taiwan into the hands of the KMT and 
consequentially the ROC. The Potsdam Declaration signed in July of 1945 demand that 
the territories mentioned in the Cairo Declaration be handed back to China.88 Under the 
authority of the allies and the orders from Supreme Allied Commander Douglas 
MacArthur, ROC troops officially accepted Japanese surrender on Taiwan on October 25, 
1945.89 Chiang appointed Chen Yi as the Administrator of Taiwan in order to oversee the 
transition process and to oversee the people of Taiwan. For the Taiwanese, the transition 
from being a Japanese colony to Chinese Nationalist rule would prove to be as 
tumultuous if not more than the initial transition from Imperialist China to Japan.  
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ROC/KMT Rule 1945-1987 
1945-1949 Transitions After Handing Back Taiwan 
 Taiwanese sekimin and military personnel suffered at the hand of the Chinese 
troops when the war came to an abrupt end. However, as the Japanese withdrew, the 
Taiwanese were hopeful at the liberation from the Japanese at the hands of the 
Nationalists would afford them more self-governance. The six million Chinese-descended 
natives of Taiwan were generally enthusiastic at the prospect of returning to Chinese rule 
after half a century of colonial subjection to Japan. 90  
 To much dismay, the KMT made brutal attempts to eradicate any trace of 
Japanese culture as well as traditional Taiwanese culture. Inhabitants of Taiwan spoke 
Japanese for half a century as a result of colonial rule. The Nationalists struggled to 
spread the immediate use of Mandarin Chinese (guo-yu), the officially sanctioned dialect 
of the mainland government, to eradicate the use of the Japanese language. 91 
 In addition, the laws applied by the KMT were protectionist of state owned 
enterprises and maintained a monopoly on many goods that forced the people of Taiwan 
to act desperately for economic prosperity. On February 27, 1947, agents of the State 
Monopoly Bureau berated, arrested, and physically beat a street vendor for illegally 
selling cigarettes in the capital city of Taipei.92 Reports of the incident indicate that an 
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angry crowd soon gathered as this incident was taking place and protested the treatment 
of the street vendor.  
 Mass protests broke out in the coming days following the protests that broke out 
over the maltreatment of the street vendor. Taiwanese elites originally cautious with the 
KMT but later believed it to be a good opportunity to maintain more rights for the island. 
Shortly after the incident, the Taipei City Council attempted to quell protests and seek 
punishment for the police officers responsible for the original outbreak by setting up the 
“Committee to Investigate the Case of the Arrested Smuggler”. 93  
 On March 6th, the February 28 Incident Resolution Committee drafted a plan for 
reform under the broad heading of “letting the Taiwanese rule the Taiwanese,” 
demanding that islanders be able to hold important posts in the provincial administration. 
94 Administrator Chen Yi appeared to accept many of the requests made by the Taiwanese 
people and took the request to the Nanjing government to be negotiated.  Although the 
complications that led up to March 8, 1947 are largely unknown, the KMT government 
most likely saw these demands as an act of rebellion by the Taiwanese people. A brutal 
military crackdown descended on Taiwan through the port of Keelung to reassert 
Nationalist control over the island by indiscriminately shooting anyone in the streets. 95 
The widely disputed casualty total can range anywhere from 500 to 100,000. 96 In the 
aftermath of the military crackdown, Chiang had instilled the fear and obedience in the 
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Taiwanese that he had previously hoped for. The period of repression, which followed the 
228 Incident, destroyed the Taiwanese dream of a harmonious return to the Chinese 
nation. 97 
 Just 18 months following the return of Taiwan to the ROC, the local people of 
Taiwan revolted against the KMT rule.98 The Incident serves as a difficult reminder of the 
oppressive decolonization and reintegration of the inhabitants of Taiwan into the ROC.  
The 228 Incident disenchanted the Taiwanese people with the mainland cause even 
further. Vocal Taiwanese elites from the time of Japanese colonization were either killed, 
had fled, or were silenced into submission to the Nationalist government. The 228 
Incident became a shared experience that all Taiwanese remember as a moment of 
extreme suppression by mainland forces. A common identity was born out of the 228 
incidents that could distinguish the Taiwanese from the mainland Chinese that were 
attempting to rule them.  
 Today, the 228 Incident is often exploited by separatist groups to promote the idea 
that nothing good can come out of mainland rule. Many independence leaders cite it as 
evidence of dangers to come if unification were to be allowed. In present times, thee 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) push for an official memorial of the incident, largely 
to produce a sentiment of Taiwanese solidarity against the mainland and those who desire 
closer ties to Beijing. On the other hand, the Nationalists argue that the violent 
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crackdown on the island also had to do with the possibility of Communist ideology 
spreading throughout the island causing more disruption that was already gathering on 
the mainland at this time.   
 For the next two years, Administrator Chen Yi carried out full-fledged 
decolonization. Any use of the Japanese language was explicitly banned and any relics of 
Japanese colonial rule were confiscated. In the attempt to create a singular Chinese 
identity, separate from the Japanese identity of the past, the Nationalists only created an 
even stronger Taiwanese solidarity as victims of the Mainland Chinese rule. The period 
of time under martial law bred a strong sentiment of a distinct difference between the 
mainlander (waishengren) and native Taiwanese (benshegnren) that would be passed 
down to the next generation. The 228 Incident was among the first acts committed by 
Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT to earn the hatred of the Taiwanese people.  
 Many Taiwanese leaders had been “liquidated” or driven into exile, and those that 
remained following the 228 Incident had been terrorized into silence. 99 Native 
Taiwanese people in the central part of the island talked of “three hopes”: wishful hope 
(hsi-wang) from the time of Japan’s surrender though the arrival of Nationalist 
administration two months later; lost hope (shi-wang) that resulted from the performance 
of the new government; and hopelessness (chueh-wang) as many felt “the future was 
black”.100 Inflation and unemployment was rampant from 1945-1949 and the Nationalist 
government, caught up in a civil war of its own, did nothing to alleviate the economic 
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distress on the island. KMT rule at the start of Nationalist “recovery” can be deemed a 
clear failure in competence to transition the Taiwanese out of Japanese society and 
reintegrate them back into Chinese society.   
1949-1987 KMT Hegemonic Rule 
In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by Mao Zedong and the Communists and 
is forced to retreat with Nationalist supporters to the island province of Taiwan. Chiang 
relocates the capital of the ROC to Taipei and refuses to accept defeat. Chiang 
unrealistically dreams of a fourth military campaign to defeat the “rebel” groups that 
have taken over the ROC temporarily.101 Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist 
government ruled Taiwan as a foreign power, unwilling to allow for any local political 
integration. The Taiwanese were not allowed to hold public office nor were they given 
much say. Most learned to keep their mouths shut in fear of a reprisal of the 228 Incident. 
Martial law had already been declared making it illegal to maintain any 
opposition political party. Anti-KMT political culture was heavily suppressed as tens of 
thousands of people that were suspected of such crimes were arrested and at least 1,200 
were executed between 1949 and 1992.102  This institutional environment of oppression 
against any nationalism other than Chinese nationalism made it impossible to sustain an 
openly practiced Taiwanese political culture. Independence sentiments were silences and 
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only resurfaced under the guise of calling for a democratic environment that coincided 
with Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles.103 
 The Taiwanese elite lost their social status and cultural expressions of history, 
language and voice. 104 From 1945-1965, the KMT introduced a Glorious Restoration 
(guang fu) campaign to legitimize the rule of the KMT’s mainlander elites on Taiwan.105 
Cultural cleavages between the mainland and the native Taiwanese would grow 
throughout this period of time. These programs aided the native Taiwanese in 
distinguishing the difference between what was Taiwanese and what was regarded as 
Chinese customs. The KMT was not convincing the Taiwanese people that they would 
have a significant role in the ROC if unification were achieved.  
From 1966 to 1976, a campaign of cultural renaissance was carried out to localize 
Chinese culture on the island as well as to provide a stark contrast to the Cultural 
Revolution in the mainland.106 However, the anti-communism propaganda further failed 
to prove to the Taiwanese that they had a common identity with the mainland. Mainland 
rule disenfranchised the Taiwanese in government participation and gave rise to Taiwan 
nationalism based on “Taiwan for Taiwanese”.107 
While the KMT attempted to subdue, exile, and/or stifle any opposition voices to 
Nationalist rule, one organization the KMT had trouble putting down was the 																																																								
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Presbyterian Church. The Presbyterian Church played a key role in preserving the 
Taiwanese culture and language in the face of the Japanese, and then the Nationalist 
Chinese, who attempted to impose their own culture on the island. The Church supported 
greater political rights for those who advocated democratization or independence but 
never resorted to violence. The Nationalist attempt to silence the Church would prove to 
be problematic as it sparked strong criticism by the United States.  
Chiang Kai-shek passed away on April 5, 1975108 with an international legacy as 
a leader pushed aside by the international community in favor of the Beijing government. 
Chiang Kai-shek’s death symbolized the decline of the mainland-born Nationalists, the 
waning of the ideology of the Three Principles of the People, and promises of restoring 
eventual unification.109  A political culture shift was initiated with policies less focused 
on anti-communism and recovery of or unification with the mainland.  
Chiang Kai-shek’s death brought about the chance for reform of discriminatory 
practices against the Taiwanese. A key issue in such reforms was the promise of full 
democracy. One of the first movements towards democracy by the KMT was the 
inclusion of native Taiwanese in leadership positions at the middle and lower levels of the 
party. 110  Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s heir and son, promoted this process 
known as “Taiwanization” as Chiang recognized the need to legitimize the regime by 
bringing more Taiwanese into the KMT and government ranks.  																																																								
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Furthermore, the rumors of democracy emboldened the opposition on the island 
as many took advantage of this newfound political freedom to create political factions 
outside of the Nationalist party. Many Taiwanese who were forbidden from forming their 
own political party were often referred to as dangwai, “outside the Nationalist Party”. 111 
Dangwai had struggled for decades against the corrupt elections along with their overall 
lack of resources.  
Towards Democracy 1987-1996 
  From 1896-1897, Chiang Ching-Kuo made reforms to fully realize the scope of 
democracy in Taiwan. Specifically, in March 1986, Chiang’s displayed uncharacteristic 
tolerance of the formation of the Formosan Association of Public Policy Studies (FAPA, 
Taiwanren gonggong shiwu xiehui), a sort of opposition party with local branches around 
the island.112  Further, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Minzhu jinbudang) was 
created in 1986 and became the first meaningful opposition that was formally and 
publicly established in Taiwan.113 Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in July 1987, 
months prior to his death,114 ending decades of silence on issues regarding Taiwanese 
political culture and the prospect of Taiwanese independence. Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
unprecedented actions for democracy developed a clear distinguishing factor between the 
PRC and the ROC that laid the foundations for Taiwanese civic nationalism.  																																																								
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  An environment of electoral freedom granted the Taiwanese, specifically the non-
KMT politicians and intellectuals, the ability to speak out and form their own 
independent political ideology. The moment that political dissent became officially 
permitted, the old culture clash was formalized as an ethnic struggle in which 
“Taiwanese” faced off against “mainlanders. 115 Longtime persecution of the Taiwanese 
political identity under the KMT regime brought about a sentiment of “common 
suffering” or a “community of fate” that was exploited by the DPP in seeking to craft a 
separate Taiwanese identity. 116 Cross-strait relations between Taiwan and the mainland 
grew more complicated as the Taiwanese opened exploration of a “cultural identity as 
ambiguous as their island’s political identity”. 117 
Lee Teng-hui Era 
 Lee Teng-hui was born in 1923 during the period of Japanese rule. During his 
years of compulsory Japanese education, Lee studied under the guidance of Japanese 
teachers, learned to speak Japanese, and even memorized Japan’s national anthem 
Kimigayo that praised the emperor.118 Lee’s quest for higher education was always met 
with discrimination in a system that was preferential towards Japanese students. In his 
youth, Lee was able to comprehend the meanings of educational discrimination, political 
inequality, and social injustice.119  Lee Teng-hui’s upbringing in a discriminatory 
environment could very well have contributed to his quest a Taiwanese civic identity that 																																																								
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was equal to that of the Chinese. Following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, then 
Vice-President Lee Teng-hui assumed the presidency.  
 In 1990, President Lee Teng-hui announced the National Unification Guidelines 
(NUG) as a formalized process by which the PRC and Taiwan could get to their stated 
goal of unification.120 The National Unification Council adopted the NUG in February 
1991 and the Executive Yuan did as well in March of the same year.121 However, in 
1994, President Lee Teng-hui participated in an interview with Japanese writer Shima 
Ryutaro entitled, “the sorrow of being born a Taiwanese,” that revealed separatist 
sentiments.122 Lee would go on to save the KMT from certain defeat at the hands of the 
DPP. “Lee’s impeccable credentials as the native son outmaneuvered the DPP’s trump 
card of “native Taiwanese in control of their own destiny.”123  In 1996, Lee Teng-hui 
became Taiwan’s first directly elected president, earning 54 percent of the vote, and the 
first leader of Taiwan to publicly promote moving away from the unification goal.124 The 
election represented the culmination of Taiwan’s democratic transition that had been a 
decade in the making.  
  Ultimately, Lee Teng-hui rejected the idea of “One Country, Two Systems” as 
Beijing had not only refused to renounce the use of force in unifying Taiwan and the PRC 
but also, because such a system would make Taiwan into a local provincial 																																																								
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government.125 Taiwan consistently desires for an international role, as it would solidify 
the Taiwanese political identity. In addition, Lee argued that the Beijing government 
upheld the “Four Cardinal Principles” while Taipei practiced Sun Yat-sen’s objective of a 
free and democratic China with equal distribution of wealth.126 In Lee’s opinion, one 
country, two systems was not up the standards of a free and democratic system. Lee 
wished to open communication for unification and established three steps the PRC would 
have to take in order to begin communications: Democratization; Renunciation of force; 
Diplomatic restraint.127  
  President Lee declared a “New Taiwanese” identity during the 1998 legislative 
elections as an effort to find a point of national political unity for the ethnic divide on the 
island and to induce people to localize their send of cultural identity, regardless of place 
of origin.128 Lee’s comments gave the people of Taiwan the ability to formulate a unified 
identity that was separate from the previous KMT mandated Chinese identity that had 
been forced upon the Taiwanese for decades. President Lee argued in his 1999 book 
Advocating for Taiwan that the “’Taiwanese identity’ need not be tied down by the 
formality of ‘Taiwan independence’”. 129   
President Lee’s interview with Deutsche Welle in July 1999 marked a decisive 
shift in Taiwan’s political culture. Lee was provoked when asked a question in regards to 																																																								
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Taiwan’s status as a “province in rebellion.130 This question prompted President Lee to 
answer with the controversial statement that: “The 1991 constitutional amendments have 
placed cross-strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-
state relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government 
and a renegade group, or between a central government and local government.” 131 Lee 
Teng-hui’s comments insinuating that the ROC was a separate state set off alarming 
reactions in the PRC. Beijing viewed this statement as a major shift in Taiwanese policy 
towards independence and the recognition of a Taiwan state.  
Full Democratization (2000-Present Time) 
Chen Shui-bian Administration (2000-2008) 
While the KMT initiated the awakening of Taiwanese consciousness in the 1990s, 
it was the ascendency of the DPP to the presidency from 2000-2008 that created an 
environment to mobilized the Taiwanese to divest from the Chinese identity. On March 
18, 2000, the election of Taiwan’s first opposition leader, Chen Shui-bian, marked the 
true beginning of democracy in Taiwan for many Taiwanese. Some Taiwanese called 
Chen’s win the final step in Taiwan’s “political miracle”.132  However, it soon became 
clear that Chen had not won the election based on DPP popularity but because James 
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Soong, who had failed to garner the KMT candidacy, ran as an independent and divided 
KMT votes. 133  
Initially, Chen Shui-bian had vowed in his 2000 inaugural address that his 
administration would not seek independence with the prospect of unification still on the 
table. Chen’s inaugural address worked to invoke a Taiwanese political culture that had 
been stirring since the first free and open elections in 1996. The  DPP utilized their 
newfound power to make systematic efforts to mobilize self-awareness of a separate 
Taiwanese nation that has fully realized its democratic state that would include: “holding 
referenda, drafting a new constitution, renaming public buildings and places, erecting 
monuments to remember (and celebrate) the past, researching, writing and interpreting 
the nation’s history…engaging in cultural construction by branding, “folklorizing”, and 
commercializing the nation and its narratives.” 134  
Chen Shui-bian’s administration promoted the shift in national identity from civic 
to ethnic that was already taking place.135  The ethnocultural underpinnings of the 
Taiwanese national identity, while still preserving some Han-Chinese layers, could 
disregard the Chinese identity as it may hinder the grown of a Taiwanese nation. 136 The 
DPP employed a “de-sincization” (qu Zhongguohua) effort to divest Taiwan from it’s 
Chinese national identity references.137 Naturally, “de-sincization” efforts caused cross-
strait relations to deteriorate rapidly. The pan-blue opposition—pro-unification and KMT 																																																								
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leaning political group—fiercely opposed “de-sinicization” but did not contest the rise of 
a Taiwanese consciousness (Taiwan yishi).138 The KMT attempted to maintain an 
ambiguous unification policy under the guise of supporting ROC sovereignty.  
Soon, the previously joyous response to Chen Shui-bian’s administration was 
fleeting as many issues soon arose within Chen’s largely failed leadership and poor 
management of government entities Chen and the Democratic Progressive Party did not 
fully understand how to manage. In August 2002, Chen made the bold claim that there is 
“a state on each side” (yibian yiguo)139 of the strait. Reminiscent of Lee Teng-hui’s 
“special state-to-state” comment, Chen’s statement revived sentiments of independence 
from the mainland. In a 2003 interview with FPRI president Harvey Sicherman, Chen 
boldly claims, “The Republic of China (ROC) is a sovereign state. This is the clear and 
obvious status of our country. The ROC effectively exercised jurisdiction over the islands 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu—a fact that no one can deny.”140  Chen did not 
deny that the people of Taiwan and China share a certain degree of history and culture.141 
However, Chen remarks that the political reality is that neither Taiwan nor China is 
subordinate to the other, and Taiwan is not a part of the PRC. 142   
Further, Chen proceeded to push for a referendum vote to be paired alongside the 
2004 Presidential election. The idea of a referendum vote in Taiwan was incredibly 
troubling for PRC leaders as referendums are historically linked to independence. Rigger 
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regards the Chen administration as evidence of inexperience or demagoguery but also 
points to the fact that these incidents highlight the degree to which Taiwan’s democratic 
consolidation is incomplete. 143  
Chen Shui-bian’s administration was later filled with countless charges of 
corruption. From January to November 2006, 1,487 persons were indicted on corruption 
charges; 1,252 had been convicted.144 Of those, 77 were high government officials, 244 
were mid-level, 394 were low-level, and 58 were elected. 145  The first family, including 
Chen’s son-in-law and the First lady, was charged with using their status for personal 
profit. In 2009, Chen Shui-bian was sentenced to life in prison on charges of bribery and 
money laundering. 146 The harsh sentence was later reduced to 20 years after appeals. 147  
Return of the KMT with Ma Ying-jeou 
 In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT was elected to the presidency in a landslide 
victory due to great discontent with the DPP and the actions of Chen Shui-bian. The 
country had turned towards the KMT once again with President Ma looking towards 
more open relations with the mainland. Ma Ying-jeou’s policy objectives from the very 
start were to ease tensions across the strait, citing the opening up to the mainland in 1987 
																																																								
143 Shelley Rigger, “The Unfinished Business of Taiwan’s Democratization,” in Tucker, ed., 
Dangerous Straits, pp. 16-43.,  
144 John F. Copper, "The Devolution of Taiwan's Democracy during the Chen Shui-bian 
Era." Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 60 (2009): 463-78,  
145 Ibid.,  
146 Tania Branigan, “Taiwan court jails former president for corruption,” The Guardian (Online), 
last modified 11 September 2009, accessed 4 April 2017, 
147 Ibid.,  
		
43 
to allow Taiwan residents to be reunited with Chinese mainland relatives.148 Trade 
regulations between Taiwan and China were still in a roundabout fashion when Ma’s 
administration began in 2008. Although exports to China and Hong Kong made up about 
40 percent of Taiwan’s total exports, the vessel carrying the goods would have to first go 
to Okinawa to be stamped by the Japanese before it could go to the mainland, costing an 
average of 15,000 Japanese yen per trip.149 
 At the start of his administration, Ma Ying-jeou was optimistic about the 
normalization of relations between Taiwan and the mainland. In addition, President Ma 
promised to ease Taiwan’s ambitions for diplomatic relations stating that “cross-strait” 
relations were more important to maintain in this period of time. President George W. 
Bush praised the Ma Ying-jeou’s pursuits for warmer cross-strait relations, taking Taiwan 
off the table of issues that dominate the United States’ relationship with China. 150   
 By Ma Ying-jeou’s second term, the policies of strong ties with the PRC drew 
intense criticism from the DPP as they believed that the President was attempting to 
create a “one-China economy”. DPP dissent with the friendly policies with China led up 
to the question of a separate Taiwanese economy and identity that cannot just rely on the 
mainland to prosper.  
 The quick passage of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) fueled 
the negative sentiment towards close relations to the PRC. The CSSTA opens selected 																																																								
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service-sector markets in Taiwan to Mainland Chinese investment, and vice versa, within 
the context of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). 151 
Although the public at large rejected the agreement, Parliament and Ma Ying-jeou passed 
it through the legislature quickly and as a result drew large amounts of protest. Protests 
turned into what is now known as the Sun Flower Movement in which mainly college 
students staged a sit-in in the Legislative Yuan and Executive Yuan for three weeks to 
protest the CSSTA. 152 Protestors claimed that the negotiations were kept hidden from the 
public. This movement bred a certain degree of distrust between the people of Taiwan 
and any sort of negotiations with the mainland.   
 In 2014, the KMT was defeated in landslide nine-in-one local elections. These 
results were shocking even for those that predicted the KMT would fare poorly but never 
predicted such a devastating loss of the parliament. The Sunflower Movement earlier in 
the year shifted the political landscape of Taiwan into a more favorable landscape for the 
DPP. The Taiwanese people were now extremely any negotiations with the PRC as the 
Taiwanese political culture shifted towards separatism. 
 Furthermore, in late 2015, Ma Ying-jeou met with PRC President Xi Jin-ping in a 
landmark meeting in Singapore as the first meeting between the KMT and CCP since 
1949. During the historic meeting, President Xi remarked that “We are brothers, 
connected by flesh even if our bones are broken, we are family whose blood is thicker 
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than water.” 153 President Ma expressed support for the 1992 consensus with the 
interpretation that there is “one China” with respective interpretations of this phrase.154  
Tsai Ying-wen and the Revitalization of the DPP 
 The subsequent election of DPP’s leader Tsai Ying-wen to the presidency in 2016 
solidified the changing political landscape of Taiwan. Partially to do with the perceived 
failure of the KMT, Tsai Ying-wen became the first woman to be elected to the 
presidency in Taiwan. A greater number of the youth identified with the DPP platform 
that favors a distinct Taiwanese national identity, sovereignty for Taiwan, and decreased 
ties with the PRC. 155 In accordance with the DPP party platform, Tsai Ying-wen has 
refused to verbally support the 1992 Consensus as a framework for eventual unification 
of the ROC and PRC. While Tsai accepts the 1992 consensus to be “historical fact”, Tsai 
does not go as far as to promise that she will adhere by the historical agreement.156 In 
light of President Tsai’s position, the PRC has shut down formal channels of 
communication with the ROC government 
 As cross-strait relations worsen and the economy remains in stagnation, public 
dissent grows against the Tsai Ying-wen administration. The Taiwanese Public Opinion 
Foundation (TPOF) poll showed that 60 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the 
government’s handling of the economy, and 70 percent were dissatisfied with the current 																																																								
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economic situation. 157 A December 2016 TPOF poll placed President Tsai at a 38 percent 
approval rating.  In addition, the Taiwan tourism industry in Taiwan has suffered a 20 
percent drop in mainland tourism since President Tsai took office.158 President Tsai’s 
worsened cross-strait relations have disrupted the once abundant flow of mainland 
tourists and slowed down the tourism industry.  
 Despite these economic setbacks, President Tsai shows no intention of backing 
down from her refusal to abide by the 1992 consensus. In December 2016, President Tsai 
conducted a phone call with then United States President-elect Donald Trump, breaking a 
40-year-old diplomatic understanding and simultaneously reinvigorated the international 
debate on the status of Taiwan. While the United States has reaffirmed their 
understanding of the “one China” policy, sentiments in Taiwan have moved further away 
from eventual unification.    
FINDINGS 
 The evolution of Taiwanese identity and political culture can be divided into two 
historical categories: first, the period of foreign rule—from Dutch colonization to the end 
of KMT hegemonic rule—and second, the period of democratization—the end of KMT 
hegemonic rule in 1987 to the present time. The historical analysis above serves as a 
foundation to examine the environment of each period of Taiwanese history.  Cultural 
identity of a population may shift in accordance to a variation of the social, institutional, 
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and economic environment that each generation experiences. Thus, the freedoms of each 
generation to express Taiwanese consciousness differ greatly. While the meaning of 
Taiwanese consciousness remains relatively the same, the expression of cultural identity, 
political culture and national identity were not uniform throughout each period of history.  
Era of Foreign Rule 
 Taiwan’s history of foreign rule serves as a unique experience that many 
Taiwanese cite for their shared sense of “fate”. The era of foreign rule includes the 
history of Taiwan preceding the 1987 lifting of martial law. I define foreign rule to 
include KMT hegemonic rule to exemplify that Taiwanese consciousness of political 
culture, especially separatist sentiments, could not have emerged until after 
democratization. Taiwanese identity, especially Taiwanese political culture, was not able 
to thrive under the hegemony of Japanese colonization or Nationalist rule. Imperial Japan 
employed policies such as, kominka to ensure a certain degree of assimilation. Although 
carried out in different ways, most governor-generals deemed assimilation policies a 
priority in governance over Taiwan.  
 Furthermore, Nationalist hegemonic rule from 1945-1987 did not allow the native 
Taiwanese (benshengren) to create a distinct Taiwanese political culture. The mainlander 
(waishengren) dominated KMT focused on a chauvinist Chinese identity and did not 
allow any public dissent against Chinese nationalism. Martial law ensured that Taiwanese 
political culture was illegal to practice—especially in regards to policies of Taiwanese 
independence. Chiang Kai-shek regarded Taiwan to be a province of the ROC that would 
aid the Nationalists in rebuilding the republic. 
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Taiwanese national identity could not have been realized in the period of time 
preceding a full democratization of Taiwan. A democratic environment was the catalyst 
in unraveling Taiwanese national identity—an identity distinct from the Japanese and the 
Chinese identity.  
Democratization and the Awakening of Taiwanese Consciousness 
 A distinct Taiwanese identity unraveled rapidly following Taiwan’s 
democratization in the late 1980s. Prior to the end of KMT hegemonic rule, political 
dissidents worked in unofficial political groups known as the dangwai in order to achieve 
any form of Taiwanese political culture. The dangwai’s initiatives were unorganized and 
unsuccessful under the repressive environment of martial law.  
The end of KMT hegemonic rule created an environment in which the individual 
political ideology of principle actors could influence significant shifts in political culture. 
Principle actors–the president, the executive and legislative Yuan, party leaders— were 
responsible for stirring a sense of Taiwanese nationalism. Democracy allowed the actions 
of principle actors to reflect the will of the people and afforded the Taiwanese the ability 
to hold each principle actor accountable for their actions.  
Democracy paved the way for Taiwanese consciousness to rise in a free and open 
society. Political groups that were against the ultimate unification of the PRC and ROC 
were able to form a new Taiwanese political culture that leaned towards autonomy and 
even full-fledged independence. Principle actors no longer felt the pressure to maintain 
ambiguous cross-strait policies. Although Lee Teng-hui remained cautious in the creation 
of the 1991 National Unification Guidelines (NUG), by the end of Lee’s presidency he 
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employed the term “special state-to-state relations” in an interview with Deustche Welle, 
subsequently insinuating that the ROC was a foreign entity.  
An open democratic environment not only provided the Taiwanese the 
opportunity to publicly declare a distinct Taiwanese civic and ethnocultural national 
identity but also, the ability to hold the government accountable to uphold Taiwanese 
values. The DPP promoted policies to foster a politically salient Taiwanese national 
identity that would favor Taiwan independence.   
Furthermore, democracies depend on the will of the people—evidently it also 
helps to rid of corruption by drawing public attention to it. In Taiwan’s case, 
democratization exposed corruption159 during the Chen Shui-bian administration, shifting 
the political landscape for a period of eight years following the end of Chen’s second 
term. Taiwanese political culture The Ma Ying-jeou administration displayed a period of 
close relations with the PRC that was characteristic of the KMT. A distinct Taiwanese 
national identity served to move public opinion away policies that would result in a 
singular Chinese economy. As a result, Taiwanese political culture provided a basis for 
public protest against the KMT known as the Sunflower Movement.  
The revitalization of the DPP—following two terms of KMT rule—is the sign of 
a healthy and functioning democracy.  The will of the people now lean towards a pan-
green alliances—independence leaning, pro-DPP political ideology—that puts “Taiwan 
first.” Taiwanese consciousness has achieved maximum realization under the political 
freedoms of the democratic government. President Tsai’s landslide 2016 election victory 																																																								
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is the result of social action taken by a majority Taiwanese society. The development of 
Taiwanese consciousness has recently translated into favoring a pro-independence 
political ideology. Taiwanese national identity, under the DPP government, does not 
favor significant ties to the PRC let alone future implications for unification.  
DISCUSSION 
Taiwanese consciousness included the development of a national identity that 
united previously divided ethnic groups in Taiwan. It is important to note that cultural 
cleavages in Taiwan between the native Taiwanese (benshengren), the mainlanders 
(waishengren) and the aborigines, following democratization, rarely escalates beyond 
proper channels of political dissent. The end of KMT hegemonic rule resulted in a 
significant decrease in the threat of force. Although often politically divided along 
political party lines, the native Taiwanese (benshengren) and the mainlanders 
(waishengren) do not struggle to agree on a shared civic identity that involves the 
democratic system of government in Taiwan. The native Taiwanese has historically 
favored pan-green alliances while mainlanders or those who had identified as Chinese 
have favored pan-blue alliances.  
The Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University (NCCU) 
developed a long-term survey to track important political attitude trends in Taiwan 
following democracy. In a survey on the identity of the Taiwan population, the Election 
Study Center asked:  “In our society, there are some people who call themselves 
‘Taiwanese,’ some who call themselves ‘Chinese,’ and some who call themselves both. 
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Do you consider yourself to be ‘Taiwanese,’ ‘Chinese,’ or both?”160 In 1996, 49.3 percent 
identified as “both Taiwanese and Chinese”, 24.1 percent identified as Taiwanese, 17.6 
identified as Chinese and 9 percent did not respond.161 However, in 2016, 58.2 percent 
identified as Taiwanese, 34.3 percent identified as “both Taiwanese and Chinese”, and 
only 3.4 percent identified as Chinese.162 This 34.2 percent increase in those who identify 
as Taiwanese reflects the significant growth in Taiwanese consciousness.   
CONCLUSION 
 Taiwanese consciousness began as a reflection of resistance against foreign rule 
for the greater portion of Taiwan’s history. However, following democratization in the 
1990s, Taiwanese consciousness has been the foundation for civic and ethnocultural 
nationalism. The Taiwanese are more concerned with nation building under the sentiment 
of a shared history and a common destiny. Taiwanese consciousness encompasses the 
sentiment for ROC sovereignty as well as a distinct Taiwanese ethnocultural identity. 
Thus, the PRC is not able to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese who are unable to 
identify with the Chinese identity.  
 While the current Tsai administration has experienced setbacks as a result of its 
cross-strait policy in the first year of presidency, it is unlikely that Tsai and the DPP will 
back down from their separatist sentiments. A Taiwanese identity was the inevitable 
consequence of a free and democratic society born out of decades of isolation from the 
mainland. Taiwanese consciousness has shifted into a sense of being not only politically 																																																								
160 Core Political Attitudes Trend Chart, Election Study Center, National Cheng Chi 
University (1996-2016), http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166,  
161 Ibid.,  
162 Ibid.,  
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Taiwanese but also culturally Taiwanese. Although the PRC may be able to consolidate 
Taiwan politically, either peacefully or by force, it may not be able to reverse the 
Taiwanese cultural identity that is now deeply rooted within society.   
 Cultural cleavages between Taiwan and the PRC continue to grow as a result of 
the differences in governmental environments. Taiwan’s free and democratic society 
produces an inevitable Taiwanese consciousness that creates a distinct Taiwanese 
national identity. Taiwanese nationalism has thus, translated into social action by the 
people in the form of public protest against ties with the PRC and voting for the 
opposition DPP in the 2016 election. The steady rise in those who identify as Taiwanese 
has resulted in a politically salient cleavage between the ROC and the PRC. Although it 
is likely that both the PRC and ROC will move away from the status quo—the de facto 
sovereignty of the ROC—, it is apparent that the Taiwanese are moving further away 
from sentiments of unification.  	 	
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